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Abstract
We demonstrate that the format in which private keys are per-
sisted impacts Side Channel Analysis (SCA) security. Survey-
ing several widely deployed software libraries, we investigate
the formats they support, how they parse these keys, and what
runtime decisions they make. We uncover a combination of
weaknesses and vulnerabilities, in extreme cases inducing
completely disjoint multi-precision arithmetic stacks deep
within the cryptosystem level for keys that otherwise seem
logically equivalent. Exploiting these vulnerabilities, we de-
sign and implement key recovery attacks utilizing signals
ranging from electromagnetic (EM) emanations, to granular
microarchitecture cache timings, to coarse traditional wall
clock timings.
1 Introduction
Academic SCA tends to focus on implementations of crypto-
graphic primitives in isolation. With this view, the assumption
is that any higher level protocol or system built upon imple-
mentations of these primitives will naturally benefit from SCA
mitigations in place at lower levels.
Our work questions this assumption, and invalidates it with
several concrete vulnerabilities and attacks against modern
software libraries: we dub these Certified Side Channels, since
the novel attack vector is deeply rooted in cryptography stan-
dards. Counter-intuitively, we demonstrate that the format in
which keys are stored plays a significant role in real world
SCA security. Detailed security recommendations for key
persistence are scarce; e.g. FIPS 140-2 vaguely states “Cryp-
tographic keys stored within a cryptographic module shall be
stored either in plaintext form or encrypted form [. .] Docu-
mentation shall specify the key storage methods employed by
a cryptographic module” [1, 4.7.5].
There are (at least) two high level dimensions at play re-
garding key formats as an SCA attack vector: (1) Among
the multitude of standardized cryptographic key formats to
choose from when persisting keys: which one to choose, and
does the choice matter? Surprisingly, it does—we demon-
strate different key formats trigger different behavior within
software libraries, permeating all the way down to the low
level arithmetic for the corresponding cryptographic primitive.
(2) At the specification level, alongside required parameters,
standardized key formats often contain optional parameters:
does including or excluding optional parameters impact se-
curity? Surprisingly, it does. We demonstrate that omitting
optional parameters can cause extremely different execution
flows deep within a software library, and also that two keys
seemingly mathematically identical at the specification level
can be treated by a software library as inequivalent, again
reaching very different arithmetic code deep within the li-
brary.
Furthermore, we demonstrate that key parsing in general is
a lucrative SCA attack vector. This is due mostly to software
engineering constraints. Complex libraries inevitably stray to
convoluted data structures containing generous nesting levels
to meet the demands of broad standardized cryptography. This
is exacerbated by the natural urge to handle keys generically
when faced with extremely diverse cryptographic standards
spanning RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, Ed448, GOST, SM2,
etc. primitives. The motivation behind this generalization is
to abstract away underlying cryptographic details from appli-
cation developers linking against a library—more often than
not, these developers are not cryptography experts. Never-
theless, we observe that when loading keys modern security
libraries make varying design choices that ultimately impact
SCA security. From the functionality perspective, these de-
sign choices are sensible; from the security perspective, we
demonstrate they are often questionable.
Outline. Section 2 gives an overview of the related back-
ground and previous work. Section 3 discusses the vulnerabil-
ities discovered as a result of our analysis, with microarchitec-
ture SCA evaluations on OpenSSL RSA, DSA, and mbedTLS
RSA. We also demonstrate end-to-end attacks on OpenSSL
ECDSA using timing and EM side channels in Section 4. We
conclude in Section 5.
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2 Background
2.1 Public Key Cryptography
ECDSA. Denote an order-n generator G ∈ E of an elliptic
curve group E with cardinality f n and n a large prime and
f the small cofactor. The user’s private key α is an integer
uniformly chosen from {1 . .n− 1} and the corresponding
public key is D = [α]G. With approved hash function Hash(),
the ECDSA digital signature (r,s) on message m (denoting
with h < n the representation of Hash(m) as an integer) is
r = ([k]G)x mod n, s = k−1(h+αr) mod n (1)
where k is a nonce chosen uniformly from {1 . .n−1}.
RSA. According to the PKCS #1 v2.2 standard (RFC
8017 [46]), an RSA private key consists of the eight param-
eters {N,e, p,q,d,dp,dq, iq} where all but the first two are
secret, and N = pq for primes p, q. Public exponent e is usu-
ally small and the following holds:
d = e−1 mod lcm(p−1,q−1) (2)
In addition, Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) parameters
are stored for speeding up RSA computations:
dp = d mod p, dq = d mod q, iq = q−1 mod p (3)
2.2 Key Formats
Interoperability among different software and hardware plat-
forms in handling keys and other cryptographic objects re-
quires common standards to serialize and deserialize such
objects. ASN.1 or Abstract Syntax Notation One is an in-
terface description language to define data structures and
their (de/)serialization, standardized [59] jointly by ITU-T
and ISO/IEC since 1984 and widely adopted. It supports
several encoding rules, among which the Distinguished En-
coding Rules (DER), a binary format ensuring uniqueness and
concision, has been preferred for the representation of crypto-
graphic objects. PEM (RFC 7468 [37]) is a textual file format
to store and trasmit cryptographic objects, widespread despite
being originally developed as part of the now obsoleted IETF
standards for Privacy-Enhanced Mail after which it is named.
PEM uses base64 to encode the binary DER serialization of
an object, providing some degree of human readability and
support for text-based protocols like e-mail and HTTP(S).
Object Identifiers. The ASN.1 syntax also defines an
OBJECT IDENTIFIER primitive type which represents a glob-
ally unique identifier for an object. ITU-T and ISO jointly
manage a decentralized hierarchical registry of object iden-
tifiers or OID s. The registry is organized as a tree structure,
where every node is authoritative for its descendants, and
decentralization is obtained delegating the authority on sub-
trees to entities such as countries and organizations. This
mechanism solves the problem of assigning globally unique
identifiers to entities to facilitate global communication.
RSA private keys. PKCS #1 (RFC 8017 [46]) also defines
the ASN.1 DER encoding for an RSA private key, defining an
item for each of its eight parameters. As further discussed in
Section 3.4, the standard does not strictly require implemen-
tations to include all the eight parameters during serialization,
nor to invalidate the object during deserialization if one of the
parameters is not included.
EC private keys. The ANSI X9.62 standard [43] is the nor-
mative reference for the definition of the ECDSA cryptosys-
tem and the encoding of ECDSA public keys, but omits a
serialization for private keys. The SEC1 standard [2] follows
ANSI X9.62 for the public key ASN.1 and provides a DER
encoding also for EC private keys, but allows generous vari-
ation as it seems to assume different encapsulating options
depending on different protocols in which the EC private
key can be used. Flexibility in the format brings complexity
in the deserializer implementation, that needs to be stateful
w.r.t. parsing of the container of the private key encoding and
flexible enough to interoperate with other implementations
and interpretations of the standards: this already suggests
that the parsing stage shows potential as a lucrative SCA at-
tack vector. The SEC1 ASN.1 notation for ECPrivateKey
contains the private scalar as an octet string, an optional (de-
pending on the container) ECDomainParameters field, and
an optional bit string field to include the public part of the
key pair. The ECDomainParameters can be null, if the curve
parameters are specified in the container encapsulating the
ECPrivateKey, or contain either an OID for a “named” curve,
or a SpecifiedECDomain structure. The latter, simplifying,
contains a description of the field over which the EC group
is defined, the definition of the curve equation in terms of
the coefficients of its Short Weierstrass form, an encoding
of the EC base point, and its order n. Finally it can option-
ally contain a component to represent a small cofactor f as
defined at the beginning of this section. In Section 3.1 we
will further discuss about the security consequences caused
in actual implementations by the logic required to support the
cofactor as an optional field.
MSBLOB key format. MSBLOB is the OpenSSL implemen-
tation of Microsoft’s private key BLOB format supporting
different cryptosystems, using custom defined structure and
fields that might differ between cryptosystems. Some key
BLOBs use an arbitrary structure (e.g. DSS), and some key
BLOBs follow a standard (e.g. RSA follows PKCS #1 with
minor differences 1). To identify each cryptosystem a “magic
member” is used in the key BLOB structure, the member is
the hexadecimal representation of the ASCII encoding of the
cryptosystem name, e.g. “RSA1”, “RSA2”, “DSS1”, “DSS2”,
etc., where the integer dictates if it is a public or a private key.
Public and private key BLOBs are stored as binary files in
little-endian order and by default the private key BLOBs are
1https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/
seccrypto/base-provider-key-blobs#private-key-blobs
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not encrypted, it is up to the developers to choose whether to
encrypt the key. Microsoft created the public and private key
BLOBs in order to support cryptographic service providers
(CSP), i.e. third party cryptographic software modules. It is
worth noting that both private and public BLOBs are indepen-
dent from each other, thus allowing a CSP to only support and
implement the desired format according to the cryptosystem
in use, meaning that public keys can be computed on-demand
using the private key BLOB information.
PVK key format. The PriVate Key (PVK) format is a Mi-
crosoft proprietary key format used in Windows, supporting
digital signing using both DSA and RSA private keys. Little
information is available about this format but a key is typi-
cally composed of a header containing metadata, and a body
containing a private key BLOB structure as per the previ-
ous description. Following the same idea as in the private
key BLOB, the PVK header metadata contains the “magic”
value 0xb0b5f11e2 to uniquely identify this key format. Ad-
ditionally, PVK’s header contains metadata information for
key password protection, preventing the storage of private
key information in plain text. Unfortunately, PVK is an out-
dated format and it only supports RC4 encryption, moreover,
in some cases PVK keys use a weakened encryption key to
comply with the US export restrictions imposed during the
90’s 3.
2.3 Side-Channel Analysis
SCA is a cryptanalysis technique used to target software and
hardware implementations of cryptographic primitives. The
main goal of SCA is to expose hidden algorithm state by
measuring variations in time, power consumption, electro-
magnetic radiation, temperature, and sound. These variations
might leak data or metadata that allows the retrieval of confi-
dential information such as private keys and passwords. The
history of SCA is long and rich, from the military program
called TEMPEST [24] to current commodity PCs, SCA has
deeply impacted security-critical systems and it has reached
the most popular and widely used cryptosystems over the
years such as AES, DSA, RSA, and ECC, implemented in the
most widely used cryptographic libraries including OpenSSL,
BoringSSL, LibreSSL, and mbedTLS.
SCA can be broadly categorized in two specific research
fields: hardware and software. Although similar in spirit, both
fields have evolved and developed their own techniques, but
the ultimate goal is the same: extract confidential information
from a device executing vulnerable cryptographic code. A
brief overview follows.
Hardware. Ever since their inception, System-on-Chip (SoC)
embedded devices have become passively ubiquitous in the
form of mobile devices and IoT, performing security criti-
2Leetspeak for “bobsfile”!
3http://justsolve.archiveteam.org/wiki/PVK
cal tasks over the Internet. Their basic building blocks—in
terms of performing computations—are the CMOS transis-
tors, drawing current during the switching activity to depict
the behavior of logic gates. Power analysis attacks introduced
by Kocher et al. [40] rely on the fact that accumulated switch-
ing activity of these transistors influence the overall power
fluctuations while secret data dependent computations take
place on the processor and memory subsystems.
While power analysis is one way to perform SCA, devices
may also leak sensitive information through other means such
as EM [4], acoustic [27], and electric potential [29]. In con-
trast to the power side channels which require physically tap-
ping onto the power lines, EM and acoustic based SCA add
a spatial dimension. There may be slight differences when
it comes to acquiring and processing these signals, but in
essence the concept is similar to traditional power analysis,
hence the hardware based SCA techniques generally apply to
all.
Over the years more powerful SCA techniques have
emerged such as differential power analysis [40], correlation
power analysis [15], template attacks [20], and horizontal
attacks [10]. Most of these techniques rely on statistical meth-
ods to find small secret data dependent leakages.
Traditionally, hardware SCA research mainly focuses on
simpler devices such as smart cards and microcontrollers
[44, 56, 57], yet modern embedded devices are much more
complex—in terms of the architecture—running full operat-
ing systems, making it possible to deploy software libraries
such as OpenSSL. More recently, a new class of attacks has
emerged, targeting embedded, mobile devices and even PCs
on popular crypto libraries such as OpenSSL and GnuPG
[27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 42]. They employ various signal process-
ing tools to counter the noise induced by complex microarchi-
tectures. For further details, Le et al. [41] present an elaborate
discussion on hardware based SCA techniques, while Danger
et al. [22] sum up various SCA attacks and their countermea-
sures.
Software. The widespread use of e-commerce and the need
for security on the Internet sparked the development of cryp-
tographic libraries such as OpenSSL. Researchers quickly
began analyzing these libraries and it took a short time to
find security flaws in these libraries. Impulsed by Kocher’s
work [39], SCA timing attacks quickly gained traction. By
measuring the amount of time required to perform private
key operations, the author demonstrated that it was feasible to
find Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and recover
DSA keys. Later Brumley and Boneh [19] demonstrated that
it was possible to do the same but remotely, by measuring the
response time from an OpenSSL-powered web server.
As software SCA became more complex and sophisticated,
a new subclass of attacks denominated “microarchitecture
attacks” emerged. Typically, a modern CPU executes multiple
programs either concurrently or via time-sharing, increas-
ing the need to optimize resource utilization to obtain high
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performance. To achieve this goal, microarchitecture compo-
nents try to predict future behavior and future resource usage
based on past program states. Based on these observations,
researchers [12, 52] discovered that some microarchitecture
components—such as the memory subsystem—work wonder-
fully as communication channels. Due to their shared nature
between programs, some of the microarchitecture components
can be used to violate access control and achieve inter-process
communication. Among these components, researchers no-
ticed that the memory subsystem is arguably the easiest to
exploit: by observing the memory footprint an attacker can
leak algorithm state from an executing cryptographic library
in order to obtain secret keys. Since the initial discovery,
several SCA techniques have been developed to extract confi-
dential data from different memory levels and under different
threat models. Some of these techniques include FLUSH+
RELOAD [65], PRIME+PROBE [51], EVICT+TIME [51], and
FLUSH+FLUSH [34]. Moreover, recent research [7, 45, 63]
shows that most (if not all) microarchitecture components
shared among programs are a security hazard since they can
potentially be used as side-channels. Ge et al. [26] provides a
great overview on software SCA, including the types of chan-
nels, microarchitecture components, side-channel attacks, and
mitigations.
2.4 Lattice Attacks
In Section 4 we present two attacks against ECDSA signing
that differ in SCA technique, but share a common pattern:
(1) gathering several (r,s,m) tuples in a collection phase,
using SCA to infer partial knowledge about the nonce used
during signature generation; (2) a recovery phase combines
the collected tuples and the associated partial knowledge to
retrieve the long-term secret key.
To achieve the latter, we recur to the common strategy of
constructing hidden number problem (HNP) [14] instances
from the collected information, and then use lattice techniques
to find the secret key. In this section we discuss the lattice
technique used to recover the private keys.
We follow the formalization used in [53], which itself
builds on the work by Nguyen and Shparlinski [48, 49], that
assumed a fixed amount of known bits (denoted `) for each
nonce used in the lattice, but also includes the improvements
by Benger et al. [11], using `i and ai to represent, respectively,
the amount of known bits and their value on a per-equation
basis.
The collection phase of [53] as well as our Section 4.2 at-
tack recovers information regarding the LSBs of each nonce,
hence it annotates the nonce associated with i-th equation
as ki =Wibi + ai, with Wi = 2`i , where `i and ai are known,
and since 0 < ki < n it follows that 0 ≤ bi ≤ n/Wi. De-
note bxcn modular reduction of x to the interval {0 . .n−1}
and |x|n to the interval {−(n− 1)/2 . .(n− 1)/2}. Combin-
ing (1), define (attacker-known) values ti = bri/(Wisi)cn and
uˆi = b(ai− hi/si)/Wicn, then 0 ≤ bαti− uˆicn < n/Wi holds.
Setting ui = uˆi + n/2Wi we obtain vi = |αti− ui|n ≤ n/2Wi,
i.e. integers λi exist such that αti− ui−λin ≤ n/2Wi holds.
Thus ui approximate αti since they are closer than a uniformly
random value from {1 . .n−1}, leading to an instance of the
HNP [14]: recover α given many (ti,ui) pairs.
Consider the rational d+1-dimension lattice generated by
the rows of the following matrix.
B =

2W1n 0 . . . . . . 0
0 2Win
. . .
...
...
...
. . . . . . 0
...
0 . . . 0 2Wdn 0
2W1t1 . . . . . . 2Wdtd 1

Denoting~x = (λ1, . . . ,λd ,α),~y = (2W1v1, . . . ,2Wdvd ,α), and
~u= (2W1u1, . . . ,2Wdud ,0), then~xB−~u=~y holds. Solving the
Closest Vector Problem (CVP) with inputs B and~u yields~x,
and hence the private key α. Finally, as in [53], we embed the
CVP into a Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) using the classical
strategy [32, Sec. 3.4], and employ an extended search space
heuristic [25, Sec. 5].
The presence of outliers among the results of the collec-
tion phase usually has a detrimental effect on the chances
of success of the lattice attack. The traditional solution is to
oversample, filtering t > d traces from the collection phase
if d traces are required to embed enough leaked information
in the lattice instance to solve the HNP. Indicating with e
the amount of traces with errors in the filtered set of size t,
picking a subset of size d uniformly at random, the proba-
bility for any such subset to be error-free is pˆ =
(t−e
d
)/( t
d
)
.
For typical values of {t,e,d}, pˆ will be small. Viewing the
process of randomly picking a subset and attempting to solve
the resulting lattice instance as a Bernoulli trial, the number of
expected trials before first success is 1/pˆ. So an attacker can
compensate for small pˆ by running j = 1/pˆ jobs in parallel.
2.5 Triggerflow
Triggerflow [33] is a tool for tracking execution paths, previ-
ously used to facilitate SCA of OpenSSL. After users mark
up source code with annotations of Points Of Interest (POI)
and filtering rules for false positive considerations, Trigger-
flow runs the binary executable under a debugger and records
the execution paths that led up to POIs. The user supplies
binary invocation lines called “triggers”. These techniques
are useful in SCA of software, where areas that do not execute
in constant time are known and the user needs to find code
that leads up to them. The authors designed Triggerflow with
continuous integration (CI) in mind, and maintain an auto-
matic testing setup which continuously monitors all non-EOL
branches of OpenSSL for new vulnerabilities by watching
execution flows that enter known problematic areas.
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1 # ECDSA with explicit curve parameters, zero cofactor
2 debug openssl genpkey -algorithm EC -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:P-256
-pkeyopt ec_param_enc:explicit -outform DER -out p256.der↪→
3 sed -i 's/\x25\x51\x02\x01\x01/\x25\x51\x02\x01\x00/' p256.der
4 debug openssl dgst -sha256 -sign p256.der -keyform DER -out /dev/null
/etc/lsb-release↪→
1 # DSA with PVK key format
2 openssl genpkey -genparam -algorithm DSA -out dsa.params -pkeyopt
dsa_paramgen_bits:1024 -pkeyopt dsa_paramgen_q_bits:160↪→
3 debug openssl genpkey -paramfile dsa.params -out dsa.pkey
4 debug openssl dsa -in dsa.pkey -outform PVK -pvk-none -out dsa.pvk
5 debug openssl dgst -sha1 -sign dsa.pvk -keyform PVK -out /dev/null
/etc/lsb-release↪→
1 # DSA with MSBLOB key format
2 openssl genpkey -genparam -algorithm DSA -out dsa.params -pkeyopt
dsa_paramgen_bits:1024 -pkeyopt dsa_paramgen_q_bits:160↪→
3 debug openssl genpkey -paramfile dsa.params -out dsa.pkey
4 debug openssl dsa -in dsa.pkey -outform MS\ PRIVATEKEYBLOB -out dsa.blob
5 debug openssl dgst -sha1 -sign dsa.blob -keyform MS\ PRIVATEKEYBLOB
-out /dev/null /etc/lsb-release↪→
1 # RSA key validation in OpenSSL
2 openssl genrsa -out rsa.pem 2048
3 debug openssl rsa -in rsa.pem -check
4 debug openssl pkey -in rsa.pem -check
1 # RSA key loading in mbedTLS
2 create_rsa_pem.sh without_d > custom.pem
3 debug mbedtls_pk_sign custom.pem
Figure 1: New Triggerflow unit tests.
3 Vulnerabilities
We used Triggerflow to analyze several code paths on multi-
ple cryptographic libraries, discovering SCA vulnerabilities
across OpenSSL and mbedTLS. In this section, we discuss
these vulnerabilities, including the unit tests we developed
for Triggerflow that detected each of them (Figure 1), then
identify the root cause in each case.
3.1 ECC: Bypass via Explicit Parameters
From a standardization perspective, curve data for ECC key
material gets persisted in one of two ways: either including the
specific OID that points to a named curve with fixed param-
eters, or explicitly specifying the curve with ASN.1 syntax.
Mathematically, they seem equivalent. To explore the poten-
tial difference in security implications between these options,
we constructed three keys: (1) a NIST P-256 private key
as a named curve, using the ec_param_enc:named_curve
argument to the OpenSSL genpkey utility; (2) a NIST P-
256 private key with explicit curve parameters, using the
ec_param_enc:explicit argument; (3) a copy of the pre-
vious key, but post-modified with the OpenSSL asn1parse
utility to remove the optional cofactor. The first two keys ad-
ditionally used the ec_paramgen_curve:P-256 argument to
specify the target curve. We highlight that, from a standards
perspective, all three of these keys are valid. We then inte-
grated the commands to produce these keys into the Trigger-
flow framework as unit tests. Finally, we added an OpenSSL
dgst utility unit test for each of these keys in Triggerflow, to
induce ECDSA signing. What follows is a discussion on the
three distinct control flow cases for each key, regarding the
security-critical scalar multiplication operation.
Named curve. Triggerflow indicated ecp_nistz256_-
points_mul handled the operation. The reason for this is
OpenSSL uses an EC_METHOD structure for legacy ECC; the
assignment of structure instances to specific curves happens
at library compile time, allowing different curves to have
different (optimized) implementations depending on archi-
tecture and compiler features. This particular function is part
of the EC_GFp_nistz256_method, an EC_METHOD optimized
for AVX2 architectures [35]. The implementation is constant
time, hence this is the best case scenario.
Explicit parameters. Triggerflow indicated ec_scalar_-
mul_ladder handled the operation, through the default
EC_GFp_simple_method, the generic implementation for
curves over prime fields. In fact this is the oldest EC_METHOD
in the codebase, present since ECC support appeared in 2001.
The implementation of this particular function was main-
lined in 2018 [61] as a result of CVE-2018-5407 [7], SCA-
hardening generic curves with the standard Montgomery
ladder. Interpreting this Triggerflow result, we conclude
OpenSSL has no runtime mechanism to match explicit param-
eters to named curves present in the library. Ideally, it would
match the explicit parameters to EC_GFp_nistz256_method
for improved performance and SCA resistance. Failure to do
so bypasses one layer of SCA mitigations, but in this par-
ticular case the default method still features sufficient SCA
hardening.
Explicit parameters, no cofactor. Triggerflow indicated
ec_wNAF_mul handled the operation through the same
EC_METHOD as the previous case. This is a known SCA-
vulnerable function since 2009 [17], and is a POI maintained
in the Triggerflow patchset to annotate OpenSSL for auto-
mated CI. Root causing the failed Triggerflow unit test, the
function only early exits to the SCA-hardened ladder if both
the curve generator order and the curve cardinality cofactor
are non-zero. Since the optional cofactor is not present in the
key, the library assigns zero as the default, indicating either
the provided cofactor was zero or not provided at all. The
OpenSSL ladder implementation utilizes the cofactor as part
of SCA hardening, hence the code unfortunately falls through
to the SCA-insecure version in this case, bypassing the last
layer of SCA defenses for scalar multiplication. This is the
path we will exploit in Section 4.
Keys in the wild. While we reached a vulnerable code path
through a standards-compliant, valid, non-malicious key, the
fact is the OpenSSL CLI will not organically emit a key in
this form. One can argue that OpenSSL is far from the only se-
curity tool that produces keys conforming to the specification,
that it must subsequently parse since they are valid. Neverthe-
less, this leaves us with the question: do keys like this exist—
does this vulnerability matter? Investigating, we at least found
two deployment classes this vulnerability affects: (1) The
GOST engine4 for OpenSSL, dynamically adding support for
4https://github.com/gost-engine/engine
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Russian cryptographic primitives in RFC 4357 [55]. Since
the curves from the standard are not built-in to OpenSSL, the
engine programatically constructs the curve based on fixed
parameters inside the engine. However, since the cofactor
parameter to the OpenSSL EC_GROUP_set_generator API
is optional, the engine developers omit it in earlier versions,
passing NULL. When GOST keys are persisted, they have their
own OID distinct from legacy ECC standards and only sup-
port named curves; however, the usage of these curves within
the engine hits the same exact code path. (2) GOSTCoin5
is the official software stack for a cryptocurrency. It links
against OpenSSL for cryptographic functionality, but does
not support the GOST engine. Examining the digital wallet,
we manually extracted several DER-encoded legacy (OID-
wise) ECC private keys from the binary. Parsing these keys
revealed they are private keys with explicit parameters from
RFC 4357 [55], “Parameter Set A”. Upon closer inspection,
the cofactor is present in the ASN.1 encoding, yet explicitly
set to zero. Similar to the previous case, this is due to failure
to supply the correct cofactor to the OpenSSL EC API when
constructing the curve.
From this brief study, we can conclude that failure to pro-
vide the valid cofactor to the OpenSSL EC API when con-
structing curves programmatically (the only choice for curves
not built-in to the library), or importing a (persisted) ECC
private key with explicit parameters containing a zero or omit-
ted (spec-optional) cofactor are characteristics of applications
affected by this vulnerability.
Related work. Concurrent to our work, Takahashi and Ti-
bouchi [60] utilize explicit parameters in OpenSSL to mount
a fault injection attack. They invasively induce a fault during
key parsing to change OpenSSL’s representation of a curve
coefficient. This causes decompression of the explicit gen-
erator point to emit a point on a weaker curve, subsequently
mounting a degenerate curve attack [47]. At a high level,
the biggest differences from our work are the invasive attack
model and limited set of applicable curves.
3.2 DSA: Bypass via Key Formatting
As the Swiss knife of cryptography, OpenSSL provides sup-
port for PVK and MSBLOB key formats to perform digital
signatures using DSA. In fact, OpenSSL has supported these
formats since version 1.0.0, hence the library has a dedicated
file in crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c for parsing these keys. The
file contains all the logic to parse Microsoft’s DSA and RSA
private key BLOBs, common to both PVK and MSBLOB
key formats. Unfortunately, the bulk of code for parsing the
keys has seen few changes throughout the years, and more
importantly it has missed important SCA countermeasures
that other parts of the code base have received [54], allowing
this vulnerability to go unnoticed in all OpenSSL branches
5https://github.com/GOSTSec/gostcoin
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Figure 2: L1 dcache trace showing memory accesses to pre-
computed multipliers during DSA public key computation.
until now.
As mentioned previously, PVK and MSBLOB key files
contain only private key material but OpenSSL expects the
public key to be readily available, thus every time it loads any
of these key formats, the library computes the correspond-
ing public key. More specifically, the upper level function
b2i_dss reads the private key material and subsequently calls
the BN_mod_exp function to compute the public key using the
default modular exponentiation function without previously
setting the constant-time flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. First ex-
ploited by Percival [52] in 2005, this default SCA-vulnerable
modular exponentiation algorithm follows a square-and-
multiply approach—first pre-computes a table of multipliers,
and then accesses the table during the square-and-multiply
step. Note that the vulnerability does not depend on whether
the PVK key is encrypted, thus when the code reaches the
b2i_dss function, the key has been already decrypted, and
the modular exponentiation function is already leaking private
key material.
Figure 2 demonstrates the side-channel leakage obtained by
our L1 data-cache malicious spy process running in parallel
with OpenSSL during 1024-bit DSA signature generation for
both PVK and MSBLOB key formats. As can be observed,
using the PRIME+PROBE technique, our spy process is able
to capture the multipliers used during each step of the ex-
ponentiation, providing enough information to perform full
key recovery. Recall the public key is computed every time
a private key is loaded, thus an attacker has several attempts
at tracing the sequence of operations performed during the
exponentiation. Moreover, our experiments reveal that cache
sets stay constant across multiple invocations of modular ex-
ponentiation, reducing the attacker’s effort and permitting the
use of statistical techniques to improve the leakage quality.
3.3 RSA: Bypass via Key Validation
RSA key validation is a common operation required in a cryp-
tography library supporting RSA to verify that an input key
is indeed a valid RSA key. We found that OpenSSL function
RSA_check_key_ex located at crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
contains several SCA vulnerabilities. In fact, we found that
the affected function RSA_check_key_ex can be accessed by
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two public entry points: a direct call to RSA_check_key, and
through the public EVP interface calling EVP_PKEY_check
on an RSA key. Figure 1 shows the commands in OpenSSL
leading to the affected code path through the two different
public functions. Note that any external, OpenSSL-linking
application calling any of these two public functions is also
affected.
The check function takes as input an RSA key, parses the
key, and reads all of the private and public components, check-
ing the correctness of all the components. In general, the func-
tion validates the primality of p and q, then it recomputes
the rest of the values {N,d,dp,dq, iq} to compare against
the parsed values and check their validity. Unfortunately, we
found that in several cases OpenSSL uses by default SCA-
vulnerable functions to recompute these secret values.
Primality testing vulnerabilities. The prime values p and q
are the first components verified during the process. The veri-
fication is done using the Miller-Rabin primality test [58] as
implemented in the function BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex.
This function calls a lower level witness function named
bn_miller_rabin_is_prime6 where a b base value is cho-
sen randomly to compute bm mod p, in which p is the candi-
date prime and the relation 2am= p−1 holds. The witness ex-
ponentiation is performed using the BN_mod_exp_mont func-
tion, where unfortunately the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is not set
beforehand, thus a variable-time sliding window exponen-
tiation is used, allowing a malicious process to potentially
perform a data cache-timing attack to recover bits of both
prime values p and q. Moreover, the exponentiation function
gets called several time by the witness function with different
b values in order to obtain confidence about the prime val-
ues, providing multiple attempts for an attacker to capture the
leakage and perform error correction during its key recovery
attack.
In addition to the previous vulnerability, as part of the
witness function, a Montgomery setup phase occurs in
BN_MONT_CTX_set, where the inverse of 2w mod p for w-
bit architectures is computed. The modular inverse function
BN_mod_inverse is called without setting the constant-time
flag. The inverse operation uses a variation of the greatest
common divisor (GCD) algorithm, which is dependent on its
inputs {2w, p mod 2w}, thus leaking algorithm state equiva-
lent to the least significant word of both p and q.
Secret value vulnerabilities. Once the prime values p and q
are deemed correct, the key validation continues by computing
the rest of the secret components where more vulnerabilities
are found. To compute the private exponent d during the veri-
fication code path, OpenSSL uses the least common multiple
(LCM) of p− 1 and q− 1. Nevertheless, this operation is
computed as
lcm(p−1,q−1) = (p−1) · (q−1)
gcd(p−1,q−1) (4)
6In OpenSSL 1.0.2 the function is called witness.
performing the GCD computation using the BN_gcd function.
This function does not have an early exit to a constant-time
function, instead it completely ignores the flag existence, so
even if it was set it would not have any effect on the code
path taken. As mentioned previously, this function leaks GCD
algorithm state, which results in partial knowledge of p−1
and q−1.
Finally, the last vulnerability is observed during CRT
iq computation. OpenSSL computes this parameter using
the BN_mod_inverse function, which yet again misses to
properly set the constant-time flag, leaving the computation
q−1 mod p unprotected and leaking partial bits of q and p.
As can be observed, all of the vulnerabilities leak on p and q
at different degrees, but by combining all the leaks, an attacker
can use the redundancy and number-theoretic constraints to
correct errors and obtain certainty on the bits leaked.
3.4 RSA: Bypass via Missing Parameters
Recalling Section 2, an RSA private key is composed by
some redundant parameters while at the same time not all of
them are mandatory per RFC 8017 [46]: “An RSA private
key should be represented”. This implies that cryptography
implementations must deal with RSA private keys that do not
contain all parameters, requiring potentially computing them
on demand. Natural questions arise: (1) How do software
libraries handle this uncertainty? (2) Does this uncertainty
mask SCA threats? Shifting focus from OpenSSL, the remain-
ing of this section analyzes the open source mbedTLS library
in this regard.
Fuzzing RSA private key loading. Following the Trigger-
flow methodology, we developed unit tests for the mbedTLS
library, specifically for targeting RSA key loading code paths.
To this end, we analyzed the mbedTLS v2.18.1 bignum imple-
mentation and set three POIs for Triggerflow: (1) GCD com-
putation, mbedtls_mpi_gcd; (2) Modular multiplicative in-
verse, mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod; (3) Modular exponentiation,
mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod. We arrived at these POIs from state-
of-the-art SCA applied to cryptography libraries where these
operations are commonly exploited. The first two functions
are based on the binary GCD algorithm, previously shown
weak to SCA [3, 5, 8, 53, 64], while exponentiation is a clas-
sical SCA target [13, 21, 28, 40, 54].
With these POIs, we fuzz the RSA mbedTLS private key
loading code path to identify possible vulnerabilities. The
fuzzing consists of testing the loading of an RSA private key
when some parameters are equal to zero (i.e. empty PKCS #1
parameter).
After configuring the potential leaking functions as Trigger-
flow POIs, we created an RSA private key fuzzing utility that
generates all possible combinations of PKCS #1-compliant
private keys. This ranges from a private key that includes all
PKCS #1 parameters to none. While the latter is clearly in-
valid as it carries no information, other missing combinations
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could be interesting regarding SCA. As PKCS #1 defines
eight parameters, the number of private key combinations
compliant with this standard is 256.
Triggerflow provides a powerful framework for testing all
these combinations smoothly. Using Triggerflow for each of
these private keys, we tested the generic function of mbedTLS
for loading public keys: mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile. The
advantage of using Triggerflow for this task is that we can
automate the whole process of testing each code corner of
this execution path, searching for SCA threats. Figure 1 (bot-
tom) shows a Triggerflow unit test of one of these parameter
combinations, with a private key missing d. Unit tests for the
other combinations are similar.
Results. For each combination, we obtained a report that in-
dicates if and where POIs were hit or not, also recording the
program return code. A quick analysis of the generated re-
ports indicates the 256 combinations group in four classes (i.e.
only four unique reports were generated for all 256 private
key parameter combinations). Table 1 shows the number of
keys for each group. The majority of private key combinations
yield an “Invalid” return code without hitting a POI before
returning.
The group “Public” contains those private keys for which
{d, p,q} is not a subset of included parameters. In this case,
mbedTLS recognized the key as a public key even if the
CRT secret parameters are present. Nevertheless, identified as
“Public” by mbedTLS, we ignore them, since no secret data
processing takes place.
Table 1: Report groups for the 256 private keys.
Group Number of keys
Invalid 216
Public 8
POI-hit (CRT) 16
POI-hit (CRT & d) 16
The last two groups in Table 1 contain those private keys
(32 in total) that indeed hit at least one POI. Analyzing both
reports on these groups, we identified two potential leakage
points. One is related to processing of the CRT parameters,
and the other to computation of the private exponent d. We
now investigate if these hits represent an SCA threat.
Leakage analysis: CRT. The last two report groups have at
least one hit at a Triggerflow POI in a CRT related compu-
tation. In both groups, the report regarding this code path is
identical, hence the following analysis applies to both.
The Triggerflow report reveals hitting the modular inverse
POI; the parent function is mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt, com-
puting the CRT parameters in (3) as iq = q−1 mod p using
mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod. It is a variant of the binary extended
Euclidean algorithm (BEEA) with an execution flow highly
dependent on its inputs, therefore an SCA vulnerability. This
is similar to OpenSSL’s Section 3.3 vulnerability. Yet in con-
trast to OpenSSL, this code path in mbedTLS executes every
time this library loads a private key: the vulnerability exists
regardless of missing parameters in the private key.
Leakage analysis: private exponent. The last group in
Table 1 contains the CRT leakage previously described
in addition to one related to private exponent d process-
ing. The targeted POIs hit by all private key parame-
ter combinations in this group are mbedtls_mpi_gcd and
mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod. Both are called by the parent func-
tion mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent, that aims
at computing the private exponent if it is missing in the pri-
vate key using (2), involving a modular inversion. However,
for computing lcm(p− 1,q− 1) using (4), the magnitude
gcd(p−1,q−1) needs to be computed first. Therefore, the
report indicates a call first to mbedtls_mpi_gcd with inputs
p−1 and q−1. This call represents an SCA vulnerability as
the binary GCD algorithm is vulnerable in these instances
[3, 6, 8]. Note, this leakage is also present in OpenSSL (Sec-
tion 3.3), however the contexts differ. We observed OpenSSL
leakage when verifying d correctness, whereas mbedTLS
computes d because it is missing. This difference is crucial
regarding SCA, because OpenSSL verifies by checking if
de = 1 mod lcm(p− 1,q− 1) holds; yet mbedTLS indeed
computes d, executing a modular inversion (2). Therefore this
vulnerability is present in mbedTLS, and absent in OpenSSL.
After obtaining lcm(p−1,q−1), it computes d using (2)
through a call to mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod. [53, 64] exploit
OpenSSL’s BEEA using microarchitecture attacks, so at a
high level it represents a serious security threat. A deeper
analysis follows for this mbedTLS case.
Summarizing, the private exponent computation in
mbedTLS contains two vulnerable code paths: (1) GCD com-
putation of p− 1 and q− 1; and (2) modular inverse com-
putation of e modulo lcm(p−1,q−1). Next, we investigate
which of these represents the most critical threat.
The inputs of the first code path (GCD computation) are
about the same size. This characteristic implies that, for some
SCA signals, the number of bits that can be recovered is
small and not sufficient to break RSA. [5, 53] practically
demonstrated this limitation using different SCA techniques:
the former power consumption, the latter microarchitecture
timings.
However, note the inputs of the second code path (modular
inversion) differ considerably in size. The public exponent e
is typically small, e.g. 65537. Following (4), lcm(p−1,q−1)
has roughly the same number of bits as (p− 1)(q− 1);
more than 1024 because gcd(p−1,q−1) is small with high
probability [36]. This significant bit length difference be-
tween mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod inputs makes this algorithm
extremely vulnerable to SCA [6]. This difference implies
the attacker knows part of the algorithm execution flow be-
forehand, and it is exactly this part that is usually difficult to
obtain and considerably limits the number of bits that can be
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Figure 3: Sequence of right-shifts and subtractions from a
FLUSH+RELOAD attack targeting mbedTLS modular inver-
sion.
recovered employing some SCA techniques as demonstrated
in [5, 53]. This characteristic means the attacker only needs
to distinguish the main two arithmetic operations present in
this algorithm (i.e. right-shift and subtraction) to fully recover
the input lcm(p−1,q−1) that yields d.
Regarding microarchitecture attacks, this distinction lends
itself to a FLUSH+RELOAD attack. As part of our validation,
we attacked this implementation using a FLUSH+RELOAD
attack paired with a performance degradation technique [9].
We probed two cache lines: one detecting right-shift execu-
tions, the other subtractions. Figure 3 shows the start of a
trace, demonstrating the sequence extraction of right-shifts
and subtraction is straightforward.
In addition, the key loading application threat model allows
capturing several traces corresponding to the processing of
the same secret data. Therefore, the attacker can correct errors
that may appear in captured traces (e.g. fix errors produced
by preemptions) by combining the information as they are
redundant.
Recap. After the analysis of both leaking code paths we de-
tected, we conclude the private exponent leakage is easier to
exploit than that of CRT due to the large bitlength difference
between the modular inversion algorithm inputs in the for-
mer. On the other hand, the private exponent leakage is only
present when the private key does not include d; whereas the
CRT-related leakage always represents a threat regardless of
missing parameters.
4 Attacks
As highlighted in Section 3, the format used to encode a
private key can lead to the bypass of side-channel counter-
measures in cryptographic libraries: these are Certified Side
Channels. In this section we concretely instantiate the threat
in Section 3.1 with two SCA attacks against ECDSA signa-
ture generation over the popular NIST P-256 curve against
OpenSSL 1.1.1: a (potentially remote) traditional timing at-
tack and an EM attack.
We assume the victim user owns a NIST P-256 ECDSA
long-term private key, encoded using explicit curve parame-
ters (instead of using NIST P-256 OID) where the optional
cofactor parameter is set to zero. As discussed (Section 3.1),
when handling such a key in OpenSSL 1.1.1, the underlying
implementation for the EC scalar multiplication is based on a
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
5.40 5.45 5.50 5.55 5.60 5.65 5.70
Th
re
sh
ol
d
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Time (CPU cycles, millions)
≤ 252
253
254
255
256
Figure 4: Direct correlation between wall-clock execution
time of ECDSA signature generation and the bitlength of the
nonce. Measured on NIST P-256 in OpenSSL on a Raspberry
Pi 3 Model B+, bypassing all SCA hardening countermeasures
via a private key parsing trigger.
wNAF algorithm, which has been repeatedly targeted in SCA
works over the last decade, usually focusing on the recovery
of the LSBs of the secret scalar through various side channels.
4.1 ECDSA: Traditional Timing Attack
This textbook scalar multiplication code path was a popular
target for PRIME+PROBE [16, 17], FLUSH+RELOAD [9, 11,
23, 62], and EM attacks [31, 61]. Contributions from Google
[38] partially mitigated the attack vector for select named
curves with new EC_METHOD implementations, then fully even
for generic curves [61]. With the attack vector now open
again, here we explore other SCA techniques for a novel SCA
approach.
Performing a traditional timing analysis under the above
assumptions, we discovered a surprising direct correlation
between the wall clock execution time of ECDSA signature
generation and the bitlength of the nonce used to compute the
signature, as shown in Figure 4. This is surprising because
given a scalar k and its recoded NAF representation kˆ, the
algorithm execution time is a function of both the NAF length
of kˆ and its weight, so it is not obvious how to correlate these
two factors with the precise bitlength of k. Nevertheless, the
empirical results shown in Figure 4 clearly demonstrate the
latter is directly proportional to the overall algorithm execu-
tion time.
This result shares similarity to the one exploited in
CVE-2011-1945 [18], and in fact suggests that CVE applied
to not only binary curves using the Montgomery ladder, but
prime curves as well, and that there is the potential for remote
exploitability. Following their attack methodology, we devise
an attack in two phases: (1) The collection phase exploits
the timing dependency between the execution time and the
bitlength of the nonce used to generate a signature, thus se-
lecting (r,s,m) tuples associated with shorter-than-average
nonces; (2) The recovery phase then combines the partial
knowledge inferred from the collection phase to instantiate
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an HNP instance and solve it through a lattice technique (Sec-
tion 2.4).
Collection phase. To exploit the highlighted timing de-
pendency between the execution of EVP_DigestSign and
the bitlength of the used nonce, we proceeded similarly to
[18]: we built an application that locally measures the num-
ber of CPU clock cycles elapsed during the execution of
EVP_DigestSign. We collect 32000 traces for a single attack,
sorting by the measured latency, and filter the first t = 128
items: empirically this is closely related to the selection by
a fixed threshold suggested by Figure 4. We prefer the for-
mulation where we set the dimension t of the filtered set and
the total number of collected signatures, as these numbers are
more significant for comparison with other works or directly
used in the formalization of the subsequent lattice phase. We
decided to collect our traces on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+,
featuring a 1.4GHz Broadcom BCM2837B0 ARMv8 Cortex-
A53 (4 cores), 1GB RAM and running 64-bit Ubuntu 18.04
Bionic, as it is a platform equiparable to the one used later
(Section 4.2).
Lattice phase. As noted above, the collection phase in this
attack selects shorter-than-average nonces, i.e. looking at the
nonce ki as a string of bits with the same bitlength of the
generator order n,
0 < ki < 2(lg(n)−`i) < 2(lg(n)−`) < n/2` ≡ n/W < n
for some W = 2` bound, representing that at least ` con-
secutive MSBs are equal to 0. This is in contrast with the
Section 2.4 formalization, which instead implies knowledge
of nonce LSBs, so we need to slightly revise some def-
initions to frame the lattice problem using the same no-
tation. Therefore, we can define Wi = W = 2` and, simi-
larly to the formalization in Section 2.4, rearrange (1) as
ki =α(ri/si)−(−hi/si) mod n and then redefine ti = bri/sicn,
uˆi = b−hi/sicn which leads once again to 0≤ bαti− uˆicn <
n/Wi, from which the rest of the previous formalization fol-
lows unchanged.
Although it used a different lattice description, [18] also
dealt with a leak based on nonce MSBs, which led to an
interesting property that is valid also for the formalization
used in this particular lattice attack. Comparing the definitions
of ti, uˆi, and ui above with the ones from Section 2.4, we note
that in this particular attack no analogue of the ai term features
in the equations composing the lattice problem, from which
follows that even if some ki does not strictly satisfy the bound
ki < n/W there is still a chance that the attack will succeed.
As visually suggested in Figure 4, our initial analysis sug-
gested that our collection phase could filter traces for nonces
with ki ≤ 2252 with high confidence, implying W = 24 as a
conservative bound, and we did indeed successfully recover
private keys using such a bound and d = 80 traces running
j = 500 parallel jobs, each running for at most 4 hours before
assuming failure.
We then realized that the interesting property noted above
allowed us to push the bound W . While the strict value of
24 ensures with confidence a low rate of errors in the t =
128 filtered traces, it is not necessarily a good approximation
of the actual number of leading zero-MSBs for most of the
filtered traces, which forces higher lattice dimensions and
slower computation for each job. Using a larger set of training
samples, analyzing the ground truth w.r.t. the actual nonce of
each sample, we empirically determined that the distribution
of nonce bitlengths on the average set filtered by our collection
phase is a Gaussian distribution with a mean of log2 (ki) =
249, which suggests W = 27 is a better approximation of the
bound on most nonces.
Combining the better resilience to errors of this particular
lattice formulation and the higher amount of information car-
ried by each trace included in the lattice instance, we could
tune the lattice attack parameters to d = 60 and j = 500 and
reduce the maximum execution time of each parallel job to
at most 10 minutes, as the overwhelming majority of lattice
instances returned success well under this time limit or not
at all in less than 4 hours. Even with the increased failure
rate, the reduction in the time limit for successful jobs is of
great impact on the execution time of the whole attack. On
the cluster resources at our disposal we can run at most 100
jobs effectively in parallel, hence a 10 minutes time limit en-
tails that we require less than 50 minutes of computation to
execute a whole lattice phase and determine the outcome of
the attack. With the listed parameters, over 300 overall attack
runs, we measured a 37% average rate of success.
In case of success, the attacker obtains the long-term secret
key, on failure she can repeat the collection phase (accumu-
lating more traces and improving the filtering output and the
probability of success of another lattice phase) or iteratively
tune the lattice parameters (decreasing W and increasing d)
to adapt to the features of the specific output of the collection
phase, thus improving the lattice attack’s success probabil-
ity. Alternatively, considering each overall attack run as a
Bernoulli trial, using the listed parameters based on the mod-
est resources at our disposal, the expected number of overall
attack repetitions until success is 1/0.37 = 2.7.
Considerations and remote exploitability. The attack de-
tailed in this section has been conducted using local mea-
surements of the CPU clock cycle counter and directly mea-
suring the execution time of the EVP_DigestSign function
with an ad-hoc application linked against OpenSSL, thus with
higher resolution and lower noise than a remote attacker could
achieve. Nonetheless, as demonstrated by [18] this kind of
attack does not necessarily require local measurements to
be practical as noise and resolution loss can generally be
compensated by oversampling and signal processing.
The attack is not immediately exploitable over the
OpenSSL TLS implementation as the support for curves de-
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fined via explicit parameters is intentionally disabled7 for
TLS ≤ 1.2 in accordance with RFC 8422 [50], and has never
been a part of the TLS 1.3 specification. On the other hand,
finding a remote vector is just a matter of finding a protocol
implementation or application linked against a vulnerable ver-
sion of OpenSSL that generates an ECDSA signature on a
remote connection trigger. We find such a target later in Sec-
tion 4.2. All in all, while we have not demonstrated OpenSSL
is vulnerable to this attack in the true remote sense, our results
suggest concrete potential of practical remote exploitability
for third-party software.
4.2 ECDSA: EM Attack
In a much stronger (yet still SCA-classical) attack model
assuming physical proximity, we now perform an EM attack
on OpenSSL ECDSA. As far as we are aware, we are the first
to exploit this code path in the context of NIST P-256: [31]
target the 256-bit Bitcoin curve, and [61] the 256-bit SM2
curve. The reason for this is our Section 3.1 vulnerability
allows us to bypass the dedicated EC_METHOD instance on this
architecture, EC_GFp_nistz256_method which is constant
time and optimized for AVX and ARMv8 architectures. The
wNAF Double and Add operations have a different set of
underlying finite field operations—square, multiply, add, sub,
inversion—resulting in distinguishable EM signatures.
Target application. For computing the ECDSA signatures
from the protocol stack application layer we chose RFC
3161 [66] Time Stamp Protocol. The protocol ensures the
means of establishing a time stamping service: a time stamp
request message from a client and the corresponding time
stamp response from the Trusted Timestamp Authority (TSA).
In short, the TSA acts as a trusted third party that binds the
Time Stamp Token (TST) to a valid client request message—
one way hash of some information—and digitally signs it
with the private key. Anyone with a valid TSA certificate can
thus verify the existence of the information with the particular
time stamp, ensuring timeliness and non-repudiation.
In principle, the client generates a time stamp request mes-
sage containing the version information, OID of the one way
hash algorithm, and a valid hash of the data. Optionally, the
client may also send TSA policy OID to be used for creating
the time stamp instead of TSA default policy, a random nonce
for verifying the response time of the server, and additionally
request the signing public key certificate in the TSA response
message. The server timestamp response contains a status
value and a TST with the OID for the content type and the
content itself composed of DER-encoded TST information
(TSTinfo). The TSTinfo field incorporates the version number
info, the TSA policy used to generate the time stamp response,
the message imprint (same as the hashed data in the client
request), a unique serial number for the TST, and the UTC
7https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/7045
based TST generation time along with the accuracy in terms
of the time granularity. Depending on the client request, the
server response may additionally contain the signing certifi-
cate and the client provided nonce value. For further details
on TSP, the reader may refer to RFC 3161 [66].
Experiment setup. Our attack exploits point multiplication
in the ECDSA signature generation during the TSA response
phase to recover the long term private key of the server. As
a protocol-level target, we deployed uts-server 8 v0.2.0, an
open source TSA server linking against OpenSSL 1.1.1. We
configured the server with a NIST P-256 X.509 digital cer-
tificate, using the private key containing explicit parameters
with a zero cofactor, i.e. the preconditions for our Section 3.1
vulnerability. We used the OpenSSL time stamp utility ts to
create time stamp requests with SHA256 as the hash function,
along with a request for the server’s public key certificate
for verification. We used the provided HTTP configuration
for uts-server, hence the TSP messages between the (victim)
server and our (attacker) client were transported via standard
HTTP. As a device target, we selected a Linux-based PINE
A64-LTS board with an Allwinner A64 Quad Core SoC based
on Cortex-A53 which supports a 64-bit instruction set with
a maximum clock frequency of 1.15 GHz. The board runs
Ubuntu 16.04.1 LTS without any modifications to the stock
image.
To capture the EM traces, we positioned the Langer LF-
U 2.5 near field probe head on the SoC where it resulted in
the highest signal quality. For digitizing the EM emanations,
we used Picoscope 6404C USB digital oscilloscope with a
bandwidth of 500 MHz and maximum sampling rate of 5
GSps. However, we used a lower sampling rate of 125 MSps
as the best compromise between the trace quality and pro-
cessing overhead. To acquire the traces while ensuring that
the entire ECDSA trace was captured, we synchronized the
oscilloscope capture with the time stamp request message:
initiate the oscilloscope to start acquiring traces, query a time
stamp request over HTTP to the server and wait for the server
response, and finally stop the trace acquisition. We stored the
EM traces along with the DER-encoded server response mes-
sages. We parsed the messages to retrieve the hash from the
client request and the DER-encoded ECDSA signatures, used
to generate metadata for the key recovery phase. Figure 5
shows the setup we used for our attack.
Signal analysis. After capturing the traces, we moved to of-
fline post processing of the EM traces for recovering the
partial nonce information. This essentially means identifying
the position of the last Add operation. The problem is twofold:
finding the end of the point multiplication (end trigger), then
identifying the last Add operation therein. We divided the
complete signal processing phase mainly into four steps: (1)
Remove traces with errors due to acquisition process; (2)
Find the end of the ECDSA point multiplication; (3) Remove
8https://github.com/kakwa/uts-server
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Figure 5: Experiment setup capturing EM traces using Pico-
scope USB oscilloscope with the Langer EM probe positioned
on the Pine64-LTS SoC: a TSP server connected via Ethernet
serving requests over HTTP.
traces encountering interrupts; (4) Identifying the position
of the last Add operation. We started by selecting only those
traces which had peak magnitude to the root mean square ratio
within an emphatically selected confidence interval, evidently
removing traces where the point multiplication operation was
not captured or trace was too noisy to start with.
In the next step, we used a specific pattern at the end of
ECDSA point multiplication as our soft end trigger. To isolate
this trigger pattern from the rest of the signal, we first applied
a low pass FIR filter followed by a phase demodulation using
the digital Hilbert transform. We further enhanced this pattern
while suppressing the rest of the operations by applying root
mean square envelope with a window size roughly half its
sample size. We created a template by extracting this pattern
from 20 random traces and taking their average. We used the
Euclidean distance between the trace and template to find
the end of point multiplication. We dropped all traces where
the Euclidean distance was above an experimental threshold
value, i.e. no soft trigger found. The traces also encountered
random interrupts due to OS scheduling clearly identifiable as
high amplitude peaks. Any traces with an interrupt at the end
of point multiplication were also discarded to avoid corrupting
the detection of the Add operation.
To recover the position of the last Add operation, we ap-
plied a different set of filters on the raw trace, keeping the end
of point multiplication as our starting reference. Since the fre-
quency analysis revealed most of the Add operations energy
is between 40 MHz and 50 MHz, we applied a band pass FIR
filter around this band. Performing a digital Hilbert transform,
additional signal smoothing and peak envelope detection, the
Add operations were clearly identifiable (Figure 6).
To automatically extract the Add operation, we first used
peak extraction. However it was not as reliable since the
signals occasionally encountered noisy peaks or in some in-
stances the Add peaks were distorted. We again resorted to
end trigger last A
Figure 6: Four different EM traces showing the last Add (A)
operations relative to the soft end trigger. The distance in
terms of samples between the last Add and trigger gives the
number of Double (D) operations. Top to Bottom: Trace ends
with an A, AD, ADD, ADDD.
the template matching method used in the previous step, i.e.
create an Add template and use Euclidean distance for pattern
matching. For each peak identified, we also applied the tem-
plate matching and measured the resulting Euclidean distance
against a threshold value. Anything greater than the threshold
was considered a false positive peak.
These steps ensured that the error rate stays low, conse-
quently increasing the success rate of the key recovery lattice
attack. We estimated the number of Double operations us-
ing the total sample length from the middle of the last Add
operation to the end of trace as illustrated in Figure 6. To ef-
fectively reduce the overlap between the sample length metric
of different Double and Add sequences, we applied K-means
clustering to keep sequences which were close to the cluster
mean.
Attack results. We acquired a total of 500 signatures, and
after performing the signal processing steps we were left with
422 traces. Additionally, after filtering out signatures catego-
rized as “A” and hence not useful lattice-wise, we were left
with t = 172 signatures suitable for building lattice problem
instances. We chose d = 120 as the number of signatures
to populate the lattice basis. We then constructed j = 48 in-
stances of the lattice attack, randomly selecting d-size subsets
from the t signatures for each instance. We then ran these
instances in parallel on a 2.10 GHz dual CPU Intel Xeon
Silver 4116 (24 cores, 48 threads across 2 CPUs). The first
instance to succeed in recovering the private key did so in
just over three minutes. Checking the ground truth afterwards,
e = 4 out of the t signatures were categorized incorrectly, for
a suitably small error rate of about 2.3%.
12
5 Conclusion
In this work, we evaluated how different choices of private key
formats and various optional parameters supported by them
can influence SCA security. We employed the automated tool
Triggerflow to analyze vulnerable code paths in well known
cryptographic libraries for various combinations of key for-
mats and optional parameters. The results uncovered several
Certified Side Channels, circumventing SCA hardened code
paths in OpenSSL (ECC with explicit parameters, DSA with
MSBLOB and PVK formats, RSA during key validation) and
mbedTLS (RSA with missing parameters). To demonstrate
the severity of these vulnerabilities, we performed microarchi-
tecture leakage analysis on RSA and DSA and also presented
end-to-end key recovery attacks on OpenSSL ECDSA using
traditional timing and EM side channels.
In the OpenSSL case, Pereida García et al. [54] conclude
the fundamental design issue around BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
is due to it’s insecure default nature, hypothesizing in-
verted logic with secure-by-default behavior provides supe-
rior assurances. While that would indeed have prevented
CVE-2016-2178, our work shows that runtime secure-by-
default is still not enough: simply the presence of known
SCA-vulnerable code alongside SCA-hardened code poses
a security threat. For example, in this light, in our Sec-
tion 3.1 vulnerability the zero cofactor masquerades as a
virtual BN_FLG_CONSTTIME, since the exploited code path is
oblivious to the flag’s value by design.
Mitigations. As part of the responsible disclosure process,
we notified OpenSSL and mbedTLS of our findings. At the
same time, we made several FOSS contributions to help miti-
gate these issues in OpenSSL, who assigned CVE-2019-1547
based on our work. For the Section 3.1 vulnerability, we im-
plemented a fix that manually computes the cofactor from the
field cardinality and generator order using the Hasse Bound.
This works for all standards-compliant curves—named or
with explicit parameters. To mitigate the vulnerabilities in
Section 3.2 and Section 3.3, we submitted simple patches
that set the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME correctly, steering the com-
putations to existing SCA-hardened code. Finally, we inte-
grated the new Triggerflow unit tests (Figure 1). Applying all
these fixes across non-EOL OpenSSL branches as well as the
development branch, no Triggerflow POIs are subsequently
triggered, indicated the patches are effective. We are planning
to implement explicit parameters to named curve matching as
future work, to further reduce the SCA attack surface.
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